

AD-761 056

SOCIETY AND THE ARMY RESERVE

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27 February 1973

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
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AP 761056

USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

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A MONOGRAPH

by

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ABSTRACT

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FORMAT: Monograph

DATE: 27 February 1973 **PAGES:** 49

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

TITLE: Society and the Army Reserve

Faced with a declining Regular Army, the United States is once again looking to a strong civilian reserve to augment the Active Army in the event of national emergency. Secretary of Defense Laird has stated that under his total force concept the Reserve components will be the primary means of augmentation rather than an expansion of the draft or training base as has been the situation in the past. Given this increased mission in the face of a rapidly changing society and the advent of the All-Volunteer Army, can the Army Reserve maintain a sufficient number of units that are trained, ready, and responsive to meet the call? After an examination of present Army Reserve status and some of the changes that have and are taking place in society, it is concluded that today's Army Reserve cannot fulfill the requirements imposed by the total force concept. As a result, it is time to make bold and sweeping changes in our reserve system. Such changes as closer ties between the Reserve components and the Regular Army, greater cooperation between the Army Reserve and National Guard, more participation of minority groups, and the offering of challenging, meaningful work are required to elicit the full support of society.

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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

What society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more, no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror: if the mirror is a true one, the face it sees there will be its own.¹

Although conglomerate in their origins and backgrounds, the Pilgrim Fathers shared a common hatred of standing armies which to them represented the very instrument of oppression, repression, and submission that had driven them from their homelands to the new world. When faced with the reality that a military requirement existed for the common defense of their newly acquired lands, they adopted the militia system which had played such a large part in England's way of life. "Already accustomed to the use of weapons, the settler was destined to become a part time soldier despite the fact that he had little time or inclination for unnecessary training. . . ."²

In reality, the philosophy of our forefathers has become the military heritage of America. History is replete with accounts of how, after each war or period of national emergency, this country has reduced the size of its standing army and placed greater reliance on the Reserve components.

Today the United States stands on the threshold of the 1970's faced with a continuing requirement for the common defense. The atmosphere in which this requirement must be satisfied is charged by rapid societal change and further complicated by the ending of the

draft on 1 July 1973. In addition, it is envisioned that the Regular Army will continue to decline in strength and that the Reserve components will be called upon to augment it in emergencies not requiring total mobilization. This concept requires that reserve forces be maintained in a state of readiness which will make them immediately responsive when called.

The Reserve components, like the Regular Army, cannot exist in a vacuum, but must depend on society for their support. To be effective both must have the quantity and quality of personnel necessary to do the job. Today, society is preoccupied with itself and the many rapid changes it is experiencing. A long war in Southeast Asia is ending and the military services, particularly the Army, are generally in disfavor. Social values of past generations such as patriotism, selflessness, and respect for authority have been replaced by a quest for "relevance."

Will society effectively support the Reserve system or will the citizen soldier of the 70's, like his Pilgrim ancestor, have "little time or inclination for unnecessary training? . . ." ³ Can the Army Reserve accomplish its mission in light of rapid societal change and the implementation of the Volunteer Army? What are some of the alternatives available that will insure rapid and responsive augmentation of the Active Army in time of war or national emergency? It is the purpose of this paper to answer these questions by examining the US Army Reserve and society in an all-volunteer army atmosphere.

EMPHASIS ON RESPONSE

The mission of the US Army Reserve as stated in AR 140-1 is:

. . . to meet Department of the Army mobilization requirements by providing:

a. Units in accordance with Department of the Army mobilization plans in strength, state of training, and equipment sufficient to be deployed, or to support mobilization requirements with a minimum of post mobilization training time.

b. Trained individual officer, warrant officer and enlisted reinforcements for:

- (1) Active Army units
- (2) Reserve Components units
- (3) Activation of AUS units
- (4) Replacement of unit losses.⁴

This mission takes on a much greater significance in light of Secretary of Defense Laird's announcement of the "Total Force Concept."

Mr. Laird stated:

Future US military surge capabilities will have to come through a call up of National Guard and Reserve Units rather than a rapid expansion of the draft and military training base. . . . Guard and Reserve units as well as individuals of the selected reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the US military structure.⁵

The added significance of the Army Reserve's mission stems from the fact that Mr. Laird's statement is explicit in requiring immediate readiness and rapid response to a national emergency. Advances in technology have reduced the size of the world and overcome the protection afforded in the past by our two ocean barriers. We no

longer have time to train men and units after mobilization. As General Westmoreland recently stated: "Our reserve forces must maintain a level of readiness approaching that of the Active Duty Forces."⁶

Historically, reserve mobilizations have left a lot to be desired. During World War II, it generally took 2 years from the time a division was called to active duty until it was trained and committed overseas.⁷ During the first year of the Korean conflict, 202,695 reservists were called into active service. Because the preponderance of these were veterans of WW II, they were capable of being committed overseas after a brief period of refresher training.⁸ "Although the reserve units, like their active Army counterparts, were not combat ready in 1950, as individuals they constituted a trained force."⁹

Our most successful mobilization, in terms of time, was initiated as a show of force in an atmosphere of world tension. In October 1961, a total of 51,871 reservists, to include 307 nondivisional units and the 100th Training Division, were called to active duty. By December of that year, most units had completed their shakedown and were engaged in a combat training program or regular duties. Both the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army praised the Reserves for their accomplishment.¹⁰ Some observers, however, felt that the entire mobilization was a disappointment from the standpoint of the administrative, logistical, and training problems that were encountered.¹¹

Use of the Reserves in Vietnam did not occur until early 1969. The buildup of active forces, which had begun in the early 60's, was accomplished by increased draft calls and the recycling of Regular Army personnel on repetitive Vietnam tours. After the callup, some reserve units were sent to Vietnam, some were sent to Korea, and others remained in the US. Although the units sent overseas served with honor and distinction, many of those remaining in CONUS experienced difficulties brought on by a lack of equipment and often times a complete lack of mission.¹² The fact that the Reserves were not mobilized for Vietnam at the time that augmentation of active forces was required seriously damaged the credibility of the Reserve component concept. As LTC Harris W. Hollis, Chief Office of Reserve Components, put it:

The decision not to mobilize the reserve components in any significant way had an adverse effect upon the Guard and Reserves from which they have not fully recovered. When a force seemingly is made to appear anachronistic and second rate, psychological damage occurs. For what do you train if you do not perceive a real mission at hand?¹³

From these historical examples, it is evident that there has been considerable disparity between what was required, when it was required, and, in the final analysis, what was ordered. As a result, it is apparent that the Reserves never fully achieved the responsiveness required to meet the challenge of the times. Therefore, it would seem that one of the first prerequisites for building a responsive reserve force is to insure that its stated mission matches exactly the intentions of national policy. In today's advanced world,

there will be no time for lengthy postmobilization training. The requirement for the Reserve components to meet CINCPAC's combat and service support needs by D90 is a far cry from the 2 years required to "ready" the Ready Reserves in WW II.¹⁴

ORGANIZATION OF THE US ARMY RESERVE

There are three categories of the Army Reserve: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve consists of personnel who are liable for involuntary active duty in time of war or national emergency. Personnel in the Ready Reserve are assigned to either:

1. Troop Program Units which are Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), Modified To: (MTOE), or Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units, the number and type of which are directed by Department of the Army based on planned mobilization requirements.

2. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

The Standby Reserve consists of personnel who are authorized to participate voluntarily in inactive duty training, but without pay or travel allowances. These individuals do earn retirement and/or promotion credit. Although considered a separate category, the Retired Reserve is administered within the Standby Reserve.¹⁵

The Department of the Army has recently announced a sweeping reorganization of the Army that will cause many changes in the present Reserve component organization.¹⁶ Under the new concept, the three remaining CONUS armies will command all of the Army Reserve

units assigned to their control and have supervisory responsibility for the training and readiness of National Guard elements in the Army area. To assist Army commanders in carrying out this function, nine Army Readiness Regions have been established. These ARR's will be small Active Army elements which provide on-the-spot assistance to the Reserve components.¹⁷ While this new organizational concept appears to be a step in the right direction, the fact that it is just beginning to be implemented prevents any further evaluation at this time.

SECTION II. PRESENT ARMY RESERVE STATUS

Is today's Army Reserve "alive and well" or is it ailing to the degree that the prognosis indicates continued decline? Just like the Active Army, the principal factors effecting the readiness of the Army Reserve are: quantity and quality of personnel, the proficiency of training achieved, and the adequacy of logistics support.¹⁸

PERSONNEL

"The most important element of the Reserve Components is the individual soldier. . . ."¹⁹ Without the number of people required to accomplish the task, the readiness equation defies solution. For years the Reserve components have literally been force fed through the draft and by virtue of a separate and distinct fact of law which states:

a. Each male person who after August 9, 1955 becomes a member of an armed force before his 16th birthday . . . shall serve in the armed forces for a total of six years unless he is sooner discharged because of personnel hardship under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. . . . Any part of such service that is not active duty or is active duty for training shall be performed in a reserve component.

b. Each person covered by subsection a who is not a reserve and is qualified, shall, upon his release from active duty, be transferred to a reserve component of his armed force to complete the service required by subsection a.¹⁹

As a result of this law, enlisted accessions for the ARS have been active duty personnel who have a military obligation upon discharge. At present, these obligors constitute 99.6 percent of the enlisted ARS strength.²¹

In a survey taken in November 1971, respondents were asked the likelihood of their joining the Army Reserve or National Guard if "the present draft continues, or if there were no draft." While 21 percent indicated that they would join the Guard or Reserve if the draft continued, only 10 percent would be so inclined if there were no draft.²² Further evidence of the impact that draft pressure has on service in the Reserves is the fact that, of all prior and nonprior service accessions for the Army Reserve in FY 72, only 29 percent were true volunteers, i.e., those individuals who would have joined even if there had been no draft.²³ Although draft calls dropped from a high of 343,000 in FY 68 to 152,000 in FY 71, draft pressure was still sufficient to provide enough draft-induced enlistments for the Reserve to meet its personnel requirements.

However, the precipitous drop in draft calls to a low of 25,000 in FY 72 had an immediate impact on the Army Reserve as evidenced by the fact that as of 30 September 1972, it was short 29,600 personnel or 11 percent of its mandated strength.²⁴

The Reserve personnel picture is further clouded by its low retention rate of REP 63's. A REP 63 is a member of the Reserve Enlisted Program which originated in 1963. Under the provisions of this program, nonprior service personnel between the ages of 17 and 26 may enlist in the Reserve components for 6 years and in return serve on active duty for not less than 4 months. Although 91 percent of all USAR units are manned by REP 63's, the reenlistment rate for these individuals is only 4.6 percent.²⁵ Obviously, the majority of REP 63's who joined the Army Reserve during the peak years of the draft, i.e., 66, 67, and 68, will leave the service as soon as their 6-year obligation ends. Consequently, unless something is done to improve the reenlistment rate, the Army Reserve will be faced with a mass exodus of trained personnel in 72, 73, and 74, respectively.

Research Analysis Corporation surveyed men in their first and sixth year of obligated service in the Reserves. The results provide a good insight into the variety of personnel involved and helps one to better understand the magnitude of the retention problem. Table II graphically portrays pertinent background data while Table I shows a comparison of income. These tables will be discussed further in the Incentives, New Concepts, and Alternatives portion of this paper.

TABLE I

TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME, LESS MILITARY PAY,
OF FIRST AND SIXTH YEAR OBLIGORS

		PERCENT										
		0	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50
		'	'	'	'	'	'	'	'	'	'	'
Less than \$4000		XX 41%										
		ooo 4%										
\$4000-\$6000		XXXXXXXXXXXX 14%										
		ooooo 6%										
\$6000-\$8000		XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 20%										
		oooooooooooooooooooo 18%										
\$8000-\$10,000		XXXXXXXXXX 12%										
		ooooooooooooooooooooo 21%										
\$10,000-\$12,000		XXXXX 6%										
		ooooooooooooooooooooo 23%										
		xxxx First Year Obligors										
		oooo Sixth Year Obligors										

TABLE II

BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF
FIRST AND SIXTH YEAR OBLIGORS

	PERCENT										
	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
	'	'	'	'	'	'	'	'	'	'	'
Unmarried	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 67%										
	oooooo 14%										
College Graduate	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 40%										
	oooooooooooo 23%										
Some College	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 35%										
	oooooooooooooo 34%										
Blue Collar	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 34%										
	oooooocoooooo 45%										
Professional Managerial	xxxxxxx xxxxxx 29%										
	oooooooooooo 25%										
White Collar	xxxxxxx 15%										
	oocoooooo 28%										
Student or Unemployed	xxxxxxxxxxx 22%										
	oo 2%										
Self-Employed	xx 2%										
	oooooo 11%										

xxxx Men in their first year of Reserve obligation.
oooo Obligors in their sixth year.

TRAINING

In a 1970 Summary Report of Audit, the US Army Audit Agency revealed that most Army Reserve units had not achieved minimum standards in attaining their premobilization readiness objectives. Out of 423 units in one Army area, only 12 percent showed a net increase in the level of unit training over the preceding year. Individual training was also found to be deficient. Some USAR members had not completed weapons firing since 1964. In eight out of 15 units visited, proper lesson plans either had not been prepared or, if prepared, they had not been approved. In one unit, a 30-minute class lasted only 10 minutes after which the students were permitted to visit or sleep.²⁸ Although the last two deficiencies may seem hardly worth mentioning, they are included here as an indication of poor supervision resulting in a waste of valuable training time.

Poor training management has also plagued the Army Reserve. Deficiencies such as a lack of MOS trained personnel and mismanagement of personnel assets were common. In one Army area, duty MOS differed from the individual's primary MOS about 50 percent of the time. In another Army area, a review of 14 units indicated that 64 percent of the personnel were not qualified for the jobs to which they were assigned. In each instance, these discrepancies were attributed to mismanagement at the unit level and lack of effective procedures, control, and review at higher management levels.²⁹ A further indication of a lack of training emphasis can be seen from

the results of a RAC survey of personnel in their first year of obligated service. When questioned about their job in the Reserve, 27 percent of those surveyed replied that they either didn't have a job or did not know their MOS.³⁰

Today, one of the major training problems facing the Army Reserve is the fact that 91 percent of unit personnel are those who entered as REP 63's.³¹ Since the majority of these individuals enlisted only under draft pressure, it is not surprising that they carry out their reserve duties with little, if any, enthusiasm. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the Army Reserve does very little to challenge these individuals during their 48 drills and 2-week period of annual training each year. David Boldt's article in the Washington Post, "Reserve Force or Farce?", provides considerable insight into the feelings of reservists during their annual training period at summer camp. Above all, it leaves no doubt that reservists find little, if any, challenge in training.³²

Another potential problem that threatens the Army Reserve's ability to train is the widening experience gap between career reservists and those entering into the junior ranks. Today, most USAR colonels have had 4.3 years of active duty, L5's have 3.4, and majors have 2.5. On the enlisted side, we find that E9's have an average of 4.8 years of active duty, E8's, 3.7, and E7's, 3.2.³³ Also, when combat experience is considered, it follows that most of these careerists are products of WW II or Korea. As a result, the young officer and enlisted man who have spent time in Vietnam will

have little in common with their superiors in the Reserve. Not only have tactics and equipment changed, but leadership problems of today are much different than those experienced in prior wars.

It may be argued that this really isn't a problem because the top officer and noncommissioned officer deal with basically the same leadership problems in the course of their civilian pursuits. Unfortunately, this is not always true. Many top-ranking reservists do not hold executive or supervisory positions in civilian life. While they may be aware that change has taken place, they do not experience the leadership problems associated with it. In the case of those high-ranking reservists who are executives or supervisors, consideration must be given to the fact that these individuals are citizens first and soldiers second. They have devoted years to becoming expert in their civilian occupation or profession. As a result, they are able to elicit the confidence and respect of their civilian subordinates based on their experience and know-how. Conversely, these individuals may not be able to exude the same professionalism in their part-time role of military leader.

If a responsive reserve is to be developed and maintained, it would appear that two alternatives must be considered. First, action must be taken to reinforce existing educational programs or initiate new ones that will require top officers and noncommissioned officers to spend more time gaining experience with their Active Army counterparts. If this is not considered practical, a second alternative would be to have combat and combat service support units

designated for early mobilization cadred by Regular Army personnel. Such an alternative has a precedent in the Reserve system of both the British and Irish Army. Most commanders in Britain's Territorial and Army Volunteer Force are regular soldiers; however, reservists may be permitted to command if qualified.³⁴ In Ireland's Foras Cosanta Aitívi, which corresponds to the Army National Guard, all battalions are commanded by regulars.³⁵

FACILITIES

Training in the Reserves has also been seriously hampered by a lack of facilities and equipment. As far back as WW II, these factors have limited the ability of the Reserve to mobilize quickly.³⁶ More recently, a CONUS-wide survey of combat and combat support battalion training areas conducted in FY 1970 revealed that only 39 percent of the 402 battalions surveyed had adequate training areas. Increased effort on the part of State Adjutant Generals and Reserve commanders brought this level up to 50 percent.³⁷ While this is an improvement, it obviously is inadequate and will continue to pose a limitation on reserve training.

Army Reserve facilities, ranging from permanently constructed centers to leased facilities of marginal adequacy, are being replaced or expanded as required. During FY 71, nine US Army Reserve Centers and two expansion projects were completed. In addition, 12 centers and five expansion projects were under construction, but not completed at the end of this period. Overall, the Army Reserve

requires and is occupying 1,091 centers; however, only 225 of these are considered to be adequate.³⁸

Although modernization of facilities is necessary, there seems to be a self-defeating aspect of the manner in which it is being accomplished. Many inner city locations are being vacated in favor of those in outlying locations. As a result, the local Reserve unit loses its identity with the community and is, for all intents and purposes, removed from the very area in which it could perform an important social role.³⁹ Local reserve units have been compared to small businesses because they provide additional income for the area in which they are located.⁴⁰ In the case of units located in the inner cities, the additional income of reservists who are inhabitants of the area would greatly assist local business and, in turn, help to offset some of the poverty endemic to such locales.

EQUIPMENT

Both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are beginning to receive increased amounts of sorely needed up-to-date equipment to replace that which they never had or that which they gave up to meet Vietnam requirements. After Mr. Laird's announcement of the "Total Force Concept," replenishment of equipment began at the rate of one half billion dollars per year. During FY 73, that amount will increase to more than one billion dollars per year.⁴¹ While much has been accomplished, much remains to be done. An examination

of the FY 71 equipment status of the Army Reserve alone reveals a shortfall of over \$350 million in MTOE values and over \$522 million in TOE values. Major Procurement Equipment Missiles Army (PEMA) shortages most common to USAR units are carriers, cargo, reconnaissance, and command; medium tractors, and area communications systems. Shortages of other major items of equipment such as utility helicopters, self-propelled howitzers, and the new family of radios continue to exist, but are being made up at this time.⁴²

In considering new equipment for the Army Reserve, care must be taken not to consider it as a complete panacea. Experience has shown that modern, up-to-date equipment improves the readiness of a unit only to that degree with which it is used and maintained. If troops are not trained in all facets of its use, a piece of equipment is of no value. For example, a reserve unit received one of three rough terrain cranes it had requisitioned. Although this piece of equipment cost approximately \$75,000, it was not taken to summer camp because it would take too long to drive it there.⁴³ If the crane was too slow to accompany the unit to camp, how would it accompany the unit in the event it was mobilized? If the answer to this is that the crane would be shipped by rail, it would logically follow that the next question would be: Who in the unit would know how to prepare the crane for loading and shipment? The crane in this case serves very little purpose and, although its preparation for shipment to summer camp presented an ideal training situation, no one in the unit took advantage of it. One can't help but wonder how many millions of dollars worth of Army Reserve

equipment is destined to be parked in motor pools and not used. In the interest of cost effectiveness and improved Army Reserve image, it would seem that new equipment should be issued only on the basis of actual planned use rather than simply on the basis of authorization.

SECTION III. A CHANGING SOCIETY

MILITARY AGED YOUTH

An unknown philosopher once said that "nothing is as permanent as change." Had he lived today, it is likely that he would have been forced to add a comment on the rapidity with which change takes place. Over the past 20 years, societal change has occurred with ever-increasing momentum. During this period, the US has experienced both a tremendous growth in population and a shift in its population from rural to urban areas. Individually, dress, moral and ethical values, standards of living, and philosophy bear little resemblance to their counterparts of years gone by. Overall, society's pattern in recent years has been characterized by increased concern about domestic issues such as race, poverty, and the environment vis a vis national defense considerations.

As was previously pointed out, the Reserve system, like the Regular Army, does not exist in a vacuum, but must depend on society for its support. Therefore, it is important that some of the military relevant aspects of social change be examined.

By comparing certain demographic characteristics of youth in 1960 with those of 1970, definite changes become apparent. Overall, there were 12.9 million more individuals aged 14-24 in 1970 than in 1960. Whites in this age group comprise 19 percent of all whites in 1970 while blacks and others represent 21 percent of their population. In all races, the number of persons 18-24 increased from 18.1 million in 1960 to 27.0 million in 1970, an increase of 49 percent.⁴⁴

Educationally, greater numbers of youth are completing high school and college. The US Bureau of the Census reports that in 1960, 60.7 percent of the total population aged 25-29 had completed 4 years of high school or more while 11.1 percent had completed 4 or more years of college. By 1970, these percentages had increased to 75.4 percent and 16.4 percent, respectively. The education level of blacks and other minorities showed a dramatic rise. While 38.6 percent had 4 years of high school or more and 5.4 percent had 4 years of college or more in 1960, these figures were raised to 58.4 percent and 10 percent in 1970.⁴⁵ The number of blacks enrolled in college increased 110 percent between 1964-1969. On the other hand, it was found that blacks were more apt to be high school dropouts than whites. At the beginning of the school year in 1969, 33 percent of blacks aged 18-24 were not enrolled in school as opposed to 16 percent of the whites in that age group.⁴⁶

Alvin Toffler writing in Future Shock states:

Never in history has distance meant less.
Never has man's relationship with place been
more numerous, fragile and temporary.
Throughout the advanced technological
societies . . . commuting, travelling and
regularly relocating one's family has
become second nature.⁴⁷

The reality of this is the fact that 44.5 percent of persons in the
22-24 age group moved between 1969-1970.⁴⁸

After commanding a battalion in 67-68 and again in 70-71, it
is the author's experience that in addition to being better educated
and more mobile than at any other time in history, the military
aged youth (17-25) of today has a philosophy all his own. Born
during the period 1948-1956, he was brought into a world that was
threatened by nuclear devastation and saturated by violence. As he
grew up, he was exposed to increased international tension, a shooting
war in Korea, racial turmoil on the home front, assassination of high
government officials in his own country, and a disastrous war in Vietnam.
He has been cultivated in an atmosphere that has grown increasingly
more impersonal, an atmosphere in which "love thy neighbor" has been
replaced by "what's in it for me." In spite of the harshness of
society, or possibly because of it, today's youth has become more
concerned about human values than ever before. He is idealistic
in his approach and, although he doesn't actually have any new solu-
tions, he is loudly vocal about what he thinks is wrong.

As a member of the affluent society, he has not had to want
for the necessities of life or been forced to earn his keep at an
early age. Modern conveniences have reduced the workload in the

home to the point where today's youth doesn't have to perform the physical chores that were required of his father in his youth.

During his lifetime, he has witnessed the mellowing of the patriarch. Gone are the days when the father, as head of the household, ruled an autocracy. Today, mother has taken an active role in having a say in family matters and is an equal partner with the father in this regard. In many cases, the pressure of business has precluded the father's presence for extended periods and the mother has filled the void. In either case, there has been more of a tendency to talk family problems out in a democratic manner with the result that strict authoritarian discipline in the home has declined.

On the other hand, the less fortunate of today's youth have experienced such a reduction in parental influence that, for all intents and purposes, the family is no longer a unit. Although the parental attitude in the foregoing situation varies widely, the youth in either case is not accustomed to strict, authoritarian discipline. Having never experienced it, but hearing about how the military subscribes to it, he views being placed in such an atmosphere with dislike. In his article, "A New Look at the Ultimate Weapon," Chaplain (Colonel) Albert F. Ledebuhr points out that: "Contrary to adult opinion, today's young are not against rules and regulations. They want sensible rules and reasonable regulations." He goes on to explain that today's youth feel that those in authority should have the proper credentials. Rank, branch, or status has

very little impact. What is important is that the person in authority believes what he is, what he knows, and that his actions are based on his personal convictions.⁴⁹

One of youth's biggest "hangups" has been the continuation of the war in Vietnam. In a 1967 sampling of high school males, the Institute for Social Research determined that 70 percent of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the war in Vietnam was important to halt the spread of communism and to prove to other nations that the US would keep its promises. About 34 percent of the respondents disagreed with statements that the war was not in the national interest and was damaging to our national honor. In the spring of 1970, however, an appreciable shift in attitude was revealed by the fact that in the same group of high school males these percentages had fallen to 66 and 47 percent, respectively.⁵⁰ A more recent indication of continued anti-Vietnam feeling was evidenced in a survey of 17-21 year-old males conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation in 1971. In this survey, 69 percent of the respondents indicated hostility toward serving in the Army. Of those reporting hostile attitudes, some mentioned a dislike of US foreign policy while others indicated a fear of being killed or wounded.⁵¹ Although the war in Vietnam has ended, it is too early to estimate what impact it will have on this hostility.

PUBLIC OPINION

Abraham Lincoln is reported to have said: "Public opinion is everything. . . . With it nothing can fail. Without it nothing can succeed."⁵² Society's attitude toward the Army Reserve is influenced greatly by its reaction to the military services in general and its image of the Army in particular. The Opinion Research Corporation conducted a survey in August 1969 to determine just what the image of the Army was. Results showed that the Army was ranked below all the other services by the general public and high school educators. Further, younger people under 21 were considerably less favorably disposed toward the Army than those over 40.⁵³

Without question, the US Army has borne the brunt of the war in Vietnam. Not only has it suffered the most casualties, but it has been repeatedly castigated by the public for My Lai, drug abuse, racial problems, corruption in the management of its clubs and PX's, and, last but not least, the military-industrial complex. In addition, it has become very fashionable for members of Congress and other august groups in politics to make "political hay" by being supercritical of the military.

To a lesser degree, the US Army Reserve has also had its share of bad publicity. Cries of racial discrimination, ineffective training, and poor leadership have served to stimulate the general resentment of the public.^{54,55} This resentment has been reinforced by the protest of some members of the Reserve components who enlisted

to avoid active service as draftees and were subsequently called up.⁵⁶ In addition, the fact that the Army Reserve was not mobilized early in the Vietnam War has caused the average civilian to doubt the credibility of the Reserve component concept.

According to Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., a noted military sociologist, antimilitarism among intellectuals and students will be present, although less vociferous, even after the war ends in Vietnam. He feels quite strongly that the quarter-century-old honeymoon between the American public and the military establishment is coming to an end.⁵⁷

Poor Army image has been increased by the rotation of draftees and REP 63's through the Active Army and back into civilian society. Each of these individuals returns to civilian life with his own views of the Active Army. Because the majority of them were unwilling participants in an Army preoccupied with an unpopular war, their impression was not good. In the case of the draftee, the 4 years he spent in the Reserve was undoubtedly an anticlimax to his active duty tour. Similarly the REP 63, who enlisted in the Army Reserve to avoid the draft, found his service characterized by a lack of challenge and adherence to what he as a citizen soldier considered to be "Mickey Mouse." The REP 63 did not even experience the adventure and tragedy of combat. Based on the experience of both individuals, it would appear unlikely that they would offer much encouragement for their peers to voluntarily join the Army or the Army Reserve. This is reinforced by a study of 202 individuals who

enlisted in the Army during the period 22-26 February 1971.

Results show that over 50 percent enlisted on the advice of their parents, brothers, sisters, or other relatives and that peer group influence was negative more times than it was positive.⁵⁸

Society's attitude toward the military is also influenced by the current tone of US foreign policy. Today, we find ourselves in an international arena where "detente" is the name of the game. Great inroads in bettering relations have been made by President Nixon through face-to-face communication with the leaders of China and Russia. An atmosphere of "peaceful coexistence" has replaced the tension of threatened nuclear holocaust that pervaded the 50's and 60's. The Nixon Doctrine proclaims to all the world that the US has embarked on a course charted to gain and maintain world peace. Its accompanying Strategy of Realistic Deterrence has as its ultimate goal "to discourage--and ultimately to eliminate--the use of military force as a means by which one nation seeks to impose its will on another."⁵⁹

In such an atmosphere, it is hardly surprising that society feels the lessening of tension and begins to question the need for a continued high level of military spending. With the war in Vietnam at an end and the Volunteer Army concept becoming a reality, civilians no longer face the prospect of their son being called for involuntary military service. The military threat to this country, as it is perceived by the citizenry, has begun to fade beyond the realm of probability. Others will volunteer for military service, but as long as their son has a choice, it is no longer their

problem. Knowingly or unknowingly this same attitude is passed on to the military aged youth. Those who are militarily inclined or those that want to take a sabbatical from their civilian pursuits will probably join one of the active branches of the service. Those who are not militarily inclined will avoid active service and, due to the employment of the Reserves envisioned under the total force concept, will be very cautious about joining the Army Reserve.

SECTION IV. INCENTIVES, NEW CONCEPTS, AND ALTERNATIVES

Thus far, this examination of the Army Reserve and society has revealed that both are in the throes of transition. The Army Reserve is faced with accomplishing a greatly increased mission and, at the same time, solve its many internal problems, the most crucial of which is the ability to attract and retain quality personnel. Society, on the other hand, has become increasingly more disenchanted with the military and has begun to question the need for increased readiness and larger forces. In essence, changes taking place in society are counterproductive to the needs brought about by change in the Army Reserve.

In the main body of this paper, numerous problems facing the Army Reserve were surfaced and many of society's idiosyncrasies were pointed out. At this point, therefore, it is germane to examine a sampling of what the Army Reserve is attempting to do to overcome society's resistance to voluntary service and, by so doing, accomplish its mission. Such an examination will consider the

probable impact of the action on society and, where possible, alternative courses of action.

INCENTIVES

The task of developing incentives to attract and retain reservists is complicated by the diverse nature of the individual being sought. Table I (p. 10) shows that a prospective volunteer, or a man in his first year of obligated service, could well be attracted by increased financial benefits. On the other hand, the offer of these same benefits to a man in his sixth year of service may not be attractive enough to make him want to reenlist. By the same token, Table II (p. 11) points out that the percentage of single men decreases markedly during their 6-year obligation. Consequently, there must be a blend of incentives that will be attractive to the single man coming into the Reserves and, at the same time, appeal to the family man contemplating reenlistment during his sixth year of service.

Research Analysis Corporation analyzed eight major studies and the congressional hearings on the subject of personnel accessions for the Reserve components. Over 100 recommendations were made on how to attract sufficient personnel in the absence of the draft. The following nine recommendations appeared in 50 percent of the studies:

- Reenlistment Bonus
- Improve Recruiting Program
- Better Survivor Benefits
- Increased Educational Benefits
- Enlistment Bonus

Proficiency Pay
Extend Coverage of SGLI
Quarters Allowance for REP Trainees
Increase Basic Pay⁶⁰

With the exception of an improved recruiting program and increased educational benefits, all of these incentives center around increasing the income for the reservist now serving or to make serving more attractive to the prospective volunteer.

To evaluate the ability of increased financial benefits to attract large numbers of volunteers, society's feelings must be considered. Recent articles have pointed out society's rejection of increased pay without job challenge. An article in the 22 December issue of the Washington Post discusses the "blue collar blues." It points out that a Federal Task Force has found that, although today's labor force is more prosperous and better educated than at any other time, it is bored with its daily tasks. In a survey of 1,533 workers, pay ranked fifth among 25 factors while interesting work ranked first.⁶¹ A New York Times report on the same subject pointed out that the study group amassed a great deal of evidence which indicates that work is basic to human needs in that it provides individual identity and self-respect.⁶²

Dr. Frederick Herzberg, an authority in the field of human motivation, refers to items such as increased pay and benefits as "hygiene factors." He maintains that the absence of such incentives may add to job dissatisfaction, but their presence will in no way increase the individual's motivation.⁶³

It would appear that if we are to have a ready and responsive reserve, one of the prime prerequisites would be highly motivated volunteers rather than just those who are looking for additional pay and benefits. This should not be construed to mean that a man not be given a just wage for the time he puts in on the job. Quite the contrary, he should be paid well for the job; but the job should offer him a challenge that goes beyond the pay he receives for doing it.

Although enlistment bonuses and increased educational benefits may be very attractive to prospective volunteers for reserve service, consideration must be given to their increased cost and their impact on the recruiting effort of the Active Army. In FY 72, 53 percent of the Defense Budget was people-related; in FY 73, this was increased to 56 percent.⁶⁴ Similarly, the Guard and Reserve portion of the Defense Budget has increased from 2.2 billion in FY 69 to 4.1 billion in FY 73.⁶⁵

Society is beginning to question the ever-increasing costs of both active and reserve programs in the face of what they perceive to be a decreasing threat. In reality, defense costs, as a percentage of the Federal Budget, have declined from 39 percent in 1968 to about 30 percent in FY 73.⁶⁶ Notwithstanding, due to public disfavor, the military continues to be the target for society's demands to cut spending.

A case in point is the reaction of a group of Congressmen to the Reserve Bonus Bill. If passed into law, it would be expensive in that it pays an individual with no prior service a bonus of

\$1,100 in return for a 6-year enlistment in the Reserve. It also contains a provision for paying a reenlistment bonus of up to \$2,300 to individuals having a critical skill and \$1,100 to those who have noncritical skills. Although this bill passed the House on 11 October 1972 by a vote of 337-35, it was not the resounding victory that one would imagine. Some 58 members of the House didn't vote and three of the members who voted against it were reservists. The primary concern of those that voted for the bill was its cost; however, they felt that it was required to attract sufficient volunteers to man the Reserve. Its opponents referred to it as the "Killers for Hire Bill."⁶⁷

With this as a prelude, it will be very interesting to see what the Senate's reaction to the bill will be when it is introduced. More importantly, what impact does the label "Killers for Hire" have on individuals who might have enlisted under the provisions of this bill at some later date? It is the author's concern that unless incentives with a lower price tag are developed, sooner or later, society, conditioned by leaders in Congress and the media, will demand that costs be severely reduced. If this happens, the Reserve components and the Active Army will be denied the use of sorely needed incentives to attract volunteers. Without sufficient volunteers in the Active Army, the defense of this country would be seriously jeopardized.

RECRUITING

It naturally follows that in the absence of draft pressure an improved recruiting program for the Army Reserve is mandatory. Although the Army Reserve and National Guard have made a great effort in this area, there are still numerous stumbling blocks that must be overcome.

First. As previously stated, Title 10, USC, requires that any male under age 26 who enlists in any of the services or the Reserves serve a total of 6 years. This period can be all active, all reserve except for 4 months initial active duty training, or a combination of active and reserve service. Today such a law is counterproductive to the recruitment of nonprior service personnel for both the Reserves and the Regular Army. Military aged youth of today are members of the "now generation." They find it hard to visualize their lives in the next year, let alone 6 years in the future. An alternative would be to introduce a change to the law permitting a reduced and more flexible service requirement.

Second. Under the present system, an individual who completes a 3-year tour of active duty but still has a military obligation is placed in the IRR rather than being involuntarily placed in a troop program unit.⁶⁸ This would appear to be a waste of trained personnel, particularly in light of the increased emphasis on unit readiness. An alternative would be to assign the individual to the IRR for a period of 30-60 days, permit him to become adjusted to civilian life, provide him with assistance in finding a job if necessary,

insure that his address and other information pertinent to the Reserves is correct, and ascertain any special problems he might have that would preclude his serving in a troop program unit. After the first 30 days, begin a familiarization program designed to interest him in the benefits to be derived from such service and after 60 days, or earlier if the individual desires, assign him to the Reserve or National Guard unit closest to his home in which there is a vacancy for his MOS. If no vacancy exists, the individual would remain in the IRR, but be placed on a waiting list. While waiting, it would be necessary for the local Reserve component commander's representative to make periodic visits to this individual as a means to generate interest and create a feeling that the Reserves really care about their personnel.

Third. Although not previously discussed in this paper, the Army National Guard has experienced most of the same problems that have been surfaced for the Army Reserve. This is particularly true in the case of personnel as evidenced by the fact that the Guard was short 12,500 personnel as of 30 September 1972. This represents 3 percent of its mandated strength.⁶⁹ As a result, the Guard has instituted an active recruiting program that, like the Army Reserve's, is spiced with incentives. One major difference between the two is that the Guard offers the prospective enlistee the added opportunity to serve both the state and the Federal Government. Regardless of their differences, both forces are competing with the Active Army for a slice of the manpower pool. An alternative to reduce the costs of competition would be to combine the recruiting effort of the three

and offer varied and flexible options for a mix of active and reserve service.

Fourth. The Army Reserve cannot hope to gain the support of society until its racial composition is a true reflection of that society. In December 1971, the racial composition of Army reservists surveyed in their first and sixth year of service was 98 percent white and 2 percent black.⁷⁰ The Central AVF Task Force Report on Reserve Component Recruiting states that blacks represent 2.9 percent of total Reserve component strength as of 30 June 1972. In addition, it points out that blacks represented only 1.5 percent of all non-prior service reserve enlistments in FY 72. During the same period, blacks represented 14.8 percent of nonprior service enlistments in the Active Army.⁷¹

A classified study, "The Participation of Negroes in the Reserve Components of the Army," produced in 1967, sets forth many reasons why blacks are reticent to join the Reserve.⁷² Although almost 6 years have passed, the level of black participation in the Reserves remains inadequate, and many of the problems set forth in this study are still present.

In spite of the many logical reasons dictating against it, an alternative to improve the participation rate of blacks and other minorities in the Reserves would be to use their population centers in the inner cities to maximum advantage. Create reserve units officered and manned by members of the minorities. It is realized that the Army disbanded all black units in the 50's; nevertheless,

times have changed. Units established under this concept would be of the combat service support type cadred by top quality black Regular Army officers and noncommissioned officers.

Why not give the black an opportunity to serve in his own unit in his own community? Today, the news media is full of accounts of how blacks desire to accept responsibility and rise above their situation. More blacks are currently in positions of great responsibility than at any time in the author's experience; and, as we have seen, the educational level of blacks has risen sharply since 1960 (p. 19).

From the standpoint of human resources, the inner cities offer an ever-increasing source that is relatively untapped. A Bureau of the Census report covering the decade between 1960-1970 reveals that 64 percent of the white population and 71 percent of the black population resided in metropolitan areas in 1970. It also indicates that 2.6 million whites left the central cities in that decade.⁷³ During the same period, the central city population of black males aged 16-24 grew from 500,000 to 940,000.⁷⁴

Implementation of this concept would not only benefit the Army Reserve but also provide both a motivational and economic influence on the black community. It would give the black an opportunity to serve his country and, at the same time, increase his income. In addition, the presence of a reserve unit of this type would provide a community focal point on service and, in turn, channel the black's drive for recognition. It would also give young blacks something

to aspire to and, by so doing, help to offset the influence of black militancy on young blacks.

TRAINING

As a means to improve training, specific reserve units have been integrated with Active Army units for training. Although this concept has been tried during summer training periods in FY 71 and FY 72, there are still many innovations of it being considered.⁷⁵ Undoubtedly, it will prove to be extremely advantageous in many respects; however, it is erroneous to believe that it will be a complete panacea. "The Army Audit Agency Report of Reserve Activities" prepared in June 1970 points out that, where possible, units are expected to achieve 3 weeks training progress each year until completion of Basic Unit Training.⁷⁶ Under the total force concept, trained reserve units must be prepared to respond immediately in times of national emergency. Based on personal experience as a battalion commander, it is very doubtful that a unit can be considered ready for immediate employment after achieving only this degree of training progress each year. In addition, even if these units did finish their Basic Unit Training before mobilization, the requirement still exists for them to undergo Advanced Unit Training before being considered combat ready.

It is very easy to say that the answer to the training problem is to simply increase training time. However, it may be argued that this is very difficult to do without imposing an undue burden

on the earning capacity or free time of the citizen soldier. Very possibly such a demand would also be counterproductive to recruiting and retention. Notwithstanding, a means must be devised to enable reservists assigned to units designated for early mobilization to spend more time training.

One alternative would be to change the present concept of the "citizen soldier" to that of the "soldier citizen." As a soldier citizen, the reservists would be given the opportunity to volunteer for those units that are scheduled to be the first mobilized. Prior to his agreeing to serve in one of these units, he would be thoroughly briefed on the fact that drill periods and other training would be expanded over and above that of other units. In return for his service, he would be paid for the extra time required and be granted additional privileges and benefits.

The intent of this alternative is not to force an additional service requirement on any reservist, but to man specified units with true volunteers who are ready and willing to be trained. If this were accomplished, the Army would benefit from having better trained reserve units and the Reserve would benefit by having units that were capable of accomplishing their mission.

Some will argue that the soldier citizen concept is not feasible from the standpoint of its impact on the individual's free time and earning capacity. However, statistics show that in 1970 the average laborer in the private sector worked only 37.2 hours per week compared with 38.8 hours per week in 1965.⁷⁷ Also, the number of

persons engaged in nonagricultural industry aged 14 or older who hold two jobs increased from 2,425,000 in 1960 to 3,310,000 in 1970.⁷⁸ With a shorter work week and the increasing number of American males who hold two jobs, it would seem entirely feasible to capitalize on this resource.

Regardless of the time devoted to training, it is doubtful that it will produce the desired results unless it is meaningful and offers a challenge to the individual. The Reserve components have recognized this and are in the process of implementing a policy of decentralized training "coupled with unit-developed, dynamic, mission oriented, adventurous programs."⁷⁹ While this is a step in the right direction, consideration must be given to leadership and the atmosphere of training. As previously shown, the youth of today are concerned only about what is relevant now. They are also wrapped up in human values and idealistic about changing the impersonal nature of institutions (p. 20). As a result, efforts must be made to make training relevant. Further, in dealing with the "now generation," training will have to be sold rather than force fed. Leaders must be capable of stimulating the desire to learn through their personal example of professional competence and the sincerity of their convictions.

The atmosphere in which training is conducted is also important in that it must be free of as many irritants to learning as possible. It is realized that a military organization must have certain rules and regulations; however, it is important to eliminate those that

only serve as a harassment. The removal of this type irritant is one of the major objectives of the Volunteer Army concept.⁸⁰ Society is seeking a challenge (p. 28); therefore, it is incumbent on the Army Reserve to provide this challenge if it is to attract sufficient volunteers.

SECTION V. CONCLUSIONS

After examining the Army Reserve and society, one must conclude that the outlook for a ready, responsive Army Reserve is not good. Under present conditions, it is very unlikely that society will support the Army Reserve and that young men will have little time or inclination for training they believe is unnecessary.

Changes in society have been counterproductive to the needs of the Army Reserve. Society has become disenchanted with the military as a result of Vietnam and, at the same time, has become more aware of its domestic problems. With the end of the war and a perceived lessening of international tensions, it has come to look upon military spending as an extravagance, particularly in light of the need at home. In addition, since the Reserves were not mobilized at the time active forces required augmentation in Vietnam, the credibility of the Reserve component concept is seriously doubted by society.

Simultaneously, with society turning its back on the military, the Army Reserve is beginning to deteriorate with the advent of a volunteer rather than a conscript Army. With the official end of

the draft anticipated by 1 July 1973, the Army Reserve will no longer enjoy the great numbers of draft-motivated, nonprior service enlistments it did in the past. Lack of accessions, plus the fact that the majority of personnel presently manning troop units are draft-motivated enlistees who will leave the service on completion of their obligation, will result in a shortage of personnel. This, coupled with the attitude of society, will prevent the Army Reserve from accomplishing its mission.

Mr. Laird's total force concept fulfills the prime prerequisite for a responsive reserve system in that it places the mission of the Reserve in consonance with the stated intentions of national policy. Notwithstanding, this is of little use if the Reserve force designated under the concept is not capable of executing its mission.

Today, great sums of money and volumes of dialogue are being expended to improve the Reserve components, yet nothing, except the recent reorganization of the Army, has actually been done to change the way in which the Reserve system operates. After WW II, Korea, the Berlin crisis of 1968, and Vietnam, it would seem obvious that the system is desperately in need of change. Some examples of the type changes required are as follow :

- a. Closer integration of the Reserve force with the Active Army can be achieved by cadreing reserve units earmarked for early mobilization with Regular Army officers and noncommissioned officers.
- b. Reduction of reserve force cost by issuing units only that amount of equipment that can actually be used instead of all that is authorized.

c. Closer cooperation between the Army Reserve, National Guard, and Regular Army in recruiting personnel. Present competition for the same slice of the manpower pie is both costly and inefficient.

d. Closer cooperation between the Army Reserve and National Guard in the assignment of personnel to units. Personnel to fill unit vacancies requiring a particular MOS should be interchangeable between the two without the necessity of detailed administrative procedures being accomplished.

e. If the Reserves want to be representative of society, action must be taken to capitalize on the great human resource provided by the minorities in the inner cities. The establishment of all minority units cadred by minority members of the Regular Army would be one way to accomplish this

f. By offering dedicated reservists the opportunity to volunteer as "soldier citizens" for units designated for early mobilization, more training could be accomplished and a higher level of readiness could be achieved.

To provide the United States with a responsive force capable of rapidly augmenting the Active Army, the time has come to make bold, sweeping changes in the existing system. Given the present mood of society, these changes must produce a system which will be relevant and offer sufficient challenge to attract and retain the personnel required.


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